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Abstract
Deep neural networks obtain state-of-the-art performance on a series of tasks. However, they are easily fooled by adding
a small adversarial perturbation to input. The perturbation is often human imperceptible on image data. We observe a
significant difference in feature attributions of adversarially crafted examples from those of original ones. Based on this
observation, we introduce a new framework to detect adversarial examples through thresholding a scale estimate of feature
attribution scores. Furthermore, we extend our method to include multi-layer feature attributions in order to tackle the
attacks with mixed confidence levels. Through vast experiments, our method achieves superior performances in distinguishing
adversarial examples from popular attack methods on a variety of real data sets among state-of-the-art detection methods. In
particular, our method is able to detect adversarial examples of mixed confidence levels, and transfer between different
attacking methods.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have achieved state-of-the-art performance on a variety of tasks, including image classification, object
detection, speech recognition and machine translation. However, they have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial
examples. This incurs a security risk when DNNs are applied to sensitive areas such as finance, medicine, criminal justice and
transportation. Adversarial examples are inputs to machine learning models that an attacker constructs intentionally to fool
the model [1]. Szegedy et al. [2] observed that a visually indistinguishable perturbation in pixel space to the original image
can alter the prediction of a neural network. Later, a series of papers [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] designed
more sophisticated methods for the worst-case perturbation within a restricted set, often a small Lp ball with p = 0, 2,∞.
While a line of work tries to explain why adversarial examples exist [3, 17, 18, 19], a comprehensive analysis of underlying
reasons has so far been an open problem, mainly because deep neural networks have complex function forms that a complete
mathematical analysis is difficult to achieve. On the other hand, there has been a growing interest in developing tools for
tackling the black-box nature of neural networks, among which feature attribution is a widely studied approach [20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. Given a predictive model, such a method outputs, for each instance to which the model
is applied, a vector of importance scores associated with the underlying features. Feature attribution has been used to improve
transparency and fairness of machine learning models [23, 30].
In this paper, we investigate the application of feature attribution to detecting adversarial examples. In particular, we observe
that the feature attribution map of an adversarial example near the boundary always differs from that of the corresponding
original example. A motivating example is shown in Figure 1, which demonstrates images in CIFAR-10 to be fed into a
residual neural network and the corresponding feature attribution from Leave-One-Out (LOO) [27]. The latter interprets
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decisions from a neural model by observing the effects on the model of erasing each pixel of input before and after the
worst-case perturbation by C&W attack. While the perturbation on the original image is visually imperceptible, the feature
attribution is altered drastically. We further observe that the difference can be summarized by simple statistics that characterize
feature disagreement, which are capable of distinguishing adversarial examples from natural images. We conjecture that this
is because adversarial attacks tend to perturb samples into an unstable region on the decision surface.
The above observation led to an effective method for detecting adversarial examples near the decision boundary. On the other
hand, there also exists adversarial examples in which the model has high confidence [7]. Previous work has observed several
state-of-the-art detection methods are vulnerable to such attacks [33, 34]. However, we observe an interesting phenomenon:
middle layers of neural networks still contain information of uncertainty even for high-confidence adversarial examples.
Based on this observation, we generalize our method to incorporate multi-layer feature attribution, where attribution scores
for intermediate layers are computed without incurring extra model queries.
In numerical experiments, our method achieves superior performance in detecting adversarial examples generated from pop-
ular attack methods on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 among state-of-the-art detection methods. We also show the
proposed method is capable of detecting mixed-confidence adversarial examples, transferring between adversarial examples
of different confidence levels, and adversarial examples generated by various types of attacks.
2 Related Work
In this section, we review related work in feature attribution, adversarial attack, adversarial defense and detection.
Feature attribution A variety of methods have been proposed to assign feature attribution scores. For each specific instance
where the model is applied, an attribution method assigns an importance score for each feature, by approximating the target
model via a linear model locally around the instance. One popular class of methods assumes the differentiability of the model,
and propagates the prediction to features through gradients. Examples include direct use of gradient (Saliency Map) [22],
Layer-wise Relevance Propagation (LWRP) [21] and its improved version DeepLIFT [20], and Integrated Gradients [31].
Another class is perturbation-based and thus model-agnostic. Given an instance, multiple perturbed samples are generated by
masking different groups of features with a pre-specified reference value. The feature attribution of the instance is computed
according to the prediction scores of a model on these samples. Popular perturbation based methods include Leave-One-
Out [35, 27], LIME [23] and KernelSHAP [28].
It has been observed in Ghorbani et al. [36] that gradient-based feature attribution maps are sensitive to small perturbations.
Adversarial attack to feature attribution is designed to characterize the fragility. On the contrary, robustness of an attribution
method has been observed on a robust model. In fact, Yeh et al. [37] observed that gradient based explanations of an adversar-
ially trained network are less sensitive, and Chalasani et al. [38] established theoretical results for the robustness of attribution
map on an adversarially trained logistic regression. These observations indicate that the sensitivity of a feature attribution
might be rooted in the sensitivity of the model, instead of the attribution method. This motivates the detection of adversarial
examples via attribution methods.
Adversarial attack Adversarial attacks try to alter, with minimal perturbation, the prediction of an original instance from
a given model, which leads to adversarial examples. Adversarial examples can be categorized as targeted or untargeted,
depending on whether the goal is to classify the perturbed instance into a given target class or an arbitrary class different from
the correct one. Attacks also differ by the type of distance they use to characterize minimal perturbation. L∞, L0, and L2
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distances are the most commonly used distances. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) by Goodfellow et al. [3] is an efficient
method to minimize the L∞ distance. Kurakin et al. [4] and Madry et al. [8] proposed L∞-PGD (BIM), an iterative version
of FGSM, which achieves a higher success rate with a smaller size of perturbation. DeepFool presented by Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al. [5] minimizes L2 distance through an iterative linearization procedure. Carlini and Wagner [7] proposed effective
algorithms to generate adversarial examples for each of the three distances. In particular, Carlini and Wagner [7] proposed a
loss function that is capable of controlling the confidence level of adversarial examples. The Jacobian-based Saliency Map
Attack (JSMA) by [6] is a greedy method for perturbation with L0 metric. Recently, several black-box adversarial attacks
that solely depend on probability scores or decisions have been introduced. Chen et al. [9] and Ilyas et al. [10, 11] introduced
score-based methods using zeroth-order gradient estimation to craft adversarial examples. Brendel et al. [15] introduced
Boundary Attack, as a black-box method to minimize the L2 distance, that does not need access to gradient information and
relies solely on the model decision. We demonstrate in our experiments that our method is capable of detecting adversarial
examples generated by these attacks, regardless of the distance, confidence level, or whether the gradient information is used.
Adversarial defense and detection To improve the robustness of neural networks, various approaches have been proposed
to defend against adversarial attacks, including adversarial training [3, 4, 8, 39, 40], distributional smoothing [41], defensive
distillation [42], generative models [43], feature squeezing [44], randomized models [45, 46, 47], and verifiable defense [48,
49]. These defenses often involve modifications in the training process of a model, which often require higher computational
or sample complexity [50], and lead to loss of accuracy [51].
Complimentary to the previous defending techniques, an alternative line of work focuses on screening out adversarial ex-
amples in the test stage without touching the training of the original model. Data transformations such as PCA have been
used to extract features from the input and layers of neural networks for adversarial detection [52, 53, 54]. Alternative neural
networks are used to classify adversarial and original images [55, 56, 57]. Feinman et al. [58] proposed to use kernel density
estimate (KD) and Bayesian uncertainty (BU) in hidden layers of the neural network for detection. Ma et al. [59] observed
Local Intrinsic Dimension (LID) of hidden-layer outputs differ between the original and adversarial examples. Lee et al.
[60] obtained the class conditional Gaussian distributions with respect to lower-level and upper-level features of the deep
neural network under Gaussian discriminant analysis, which result in a confidence score based on the Mahalanobis distance
(MAHA), followed by a logistic regression model on the confidence scores to detect adversarial examples. Through vast
experiments, we show that our method achieves comparable or superior performance than these detection methods across var-
ious attacks. Furthermore, we show that our method achieves competitive performance for attacks with a varied confidence
level, a setting where the other detection methods fail to work [33, 34].
Most related to our work, Tao et al. [61] proposed to identify neurons critical for individual attributes to detect adversarial
examples, but their method is restricted to models in face recognition. Instead, our method is applicable across different types
of image data. Zhang et al. [62] proposed to identify adversarial perturbations by training a neural network on the saliency
map of inputs. However, their method depends on additional neural networks, which are vulnerable to white-box attacks
when attackers perturb the image to fool the original model and the new neural network simultaneously.
3 Adversarial detection with feature attribution
3.1 Feature attribution before and after perturbation
Assume that the model is a function f : Rd → [0, 1]C which maps an image x of dimension d = h× w × c to a probability
vector f(x) of dimension C, where C is the number of classes. A feature attribution method φ maps an input image x ∈ Rd
to an attribution vector of the same shape as the image: φ(x) ∈ Rd, such that the ith dimension of φ(x) is the contribution
of feature i in the prediction of the model on the specific image x. We suppress the dependence of φ on the model f for
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Figure 1. The first row shows the original CIFAR-10 examples and their corresponding feature attributions. The second row
shows the adversarial examples and their corresponding feature attributions. The third row plots the histograms of the original and
adversarial feature attributions.
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Figure 2: Histogram of dispersion measures
notational convenience. We focus on the leave-One-Out (LOO) method [35, 27] throughout the paper, which assigns to each
feature the reduction in the probability of the selected class when the feature in consideration is masked by some reference
value, e.g. 0. Denoting the example with the ith feature masked by 0 as x(i), LOO defines φ as
φ(x)i := f(x)c − f(x(i))c, where c = argmax
j∈C
f(x)j . (1)
Adversarial attacks aim to change the prediction of a model with minimal perturbation of a sample, so that human is not
able to detect the difference between an original image x and its perturbed version x′. Yet we observed that φ is sensitive
to the small difference between x and x′. Figure 1 shows the attribution maps φ(x), φ(x′) with the original image x and
its adversarially perturbed counterpart x′ by C&W attack. Even with human eyes, we can observe an explicit difference in
the attribution maps of the original and adversarial images. In particular, adversarial images have a larger dispersion in its
importance scores, as demonstrated in Figure 1. We comment here that our proposed framework of adversarial detection via
feature attribution is generic to popular feature attribution methods. As an example, we show the performance of Integrated
Gradients [31] for adversarial detection in Appendix 6.1. LOO achieves the best performance among all attribution methods
across different data sets.
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Figure 3: ROC curves of detection methods on CIFAR-10 dataset with ResNet
3.2 Quantify the dispersion in feature attribution maps
Motivated by the apparent differences in the distributions of importance scores between the original and adversarial images,
as demonstrated in Figure 1, we propose to use measures of statistical dispersion in feature attribution to detect adversarial
examples. In particular, we tried standard deviation (STD), median absolute deviation (MAD), which is the median of
absolute differences between entries and their median, and interquartile range (IQR), which is the difference between the 75th
percentile and the 25th percentile among all entries of φ(x) ∈ Rd:
IQR(φ(x)) = Qφ(x)(0.75)−Qφ(x)(0.25), where Qφ(x)(p) := min{β : #{i : φ(x)i < β}
d
≥ p}. (2)
We observe there is a larger dispersion, which we call feature disagreement, between feature contribution to a model for an
adversarially perturbed image. The difference is universal across different images. Figure 2 compares the histograms of these
three dispersion measures of feature attributions for ResNet on natural test images from CIFAR-10 with those on adversarially
perturbed images, where the adversarial perturbation is carried out by C&W Attack. We can see there is a significant difference
in the distributions of STD, MAD and IQR between natural and adversarial images. A majority of adversarially perturbed
images have a larger dispersion in feature attribution than an arbitrary natural image, besides the corresponding original
images. We propose to distinguish adversarial images from natural images by thresholding the IQR of feature attribution
maps. In Appendix 6.2, we show the ROC curves of adversarial detection using the three dispersion measures on CIFAR-10
data set with ResNet across three different attacks. All the three measures yield competitive performance. We stick to IQR
for the rest of the paper, which is robust and has a slightly superior performance among the three.
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3.3 Extension to multi-layer LOO: detection of attacks with mixed confidence levels
Carlini and Wagner [7] proposed the following objective to generate adversarial images with small L2 perturbation.
min
w
‖x′ − x‖2 + αmax{F (x)ytrue − max
j 6=ytrue
F (x′)j + c, 0}, (3)
where x′ = 0.5(tanh(w)+1), F maps an image to logits, ytrue = argmaxF (x) is the original label, and c is a hyperparameter
for tuning confidence. Adversarial images with high confidence can be obtained by assigning a large value to c. The loss can
be modified to generate L∞ constrained perturbation at different confidence levels as well [8]. Recently, Lu et al. [33] and
Athalye et al. [34] observed that LID has a poor performance when faced with adversarial examples at various confidence
scales. In our experiments, a similar phenomenon is observed for several other state-of-the-art detection methods, including
KD+BU and MAHA, as is shown in Figure 4. This suggests that characterization of adversarial examples in related work
may only hold true for adversarial examples near the decision boundary. IQR of feature attribution map, unfortunately, suffers
from the same problem.
To detect adversarial images with mixed confidence levels, we generalize our method to capture dispersion of feature attribu-
tions beyond the output layer of the model. For an adversarial example within a small neighborhood of its original example in
the pixel space but achieving a high confidence at the output layer in a different class from the original one, the feature repre-
sentation deviates away from that of its original example gradually along the layers. Thus, we expect neurons of middle layers
contain uncertainty that can be captured by a feature attribution map. We denote the map from input to an arbitrary neuron n
of an intermediate layer of the model by fn : Rd → R. The feature attribution of neuron n is defined as φfn(x) : Rd → Rd,
such that the ith entry quantifies the contribution of feature i to neuron n. For Leave-One-Out (LOO), we have
φfn(x)i = fn(x)− fn(x(i)).
To coordinate the scale difference between different neurons, we fit a logistic regression for the dispersion of feature attribution
from different neurons on a hold-out training set to distinguish adversarial images from original images. The multi-layer
extension of our method is called ’ML-LOO’.
4 Experiments
We present an experimental evaluation of ML-LOO, and compare our method with several state-of-the-art detection methods.
Then we consider the setting where attacks have different confidence levels. We further evaluate the transferability of various
detection methods on an unknown attack.
4.1 Known Attacks
We compare our method with state-of-the-art detection algorithms including LID [59], Mahalanobis (MAHA) [60], and
KD+BU [58], on three data sets: MNIST, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, with the standard train/test split [63]. We used a
convolutional network composed of 32-filter convolutional layers followed by a hidden dense layer with 1024 units for
MNIST. Each convolutional layer was followed by a max-pooling layer. For both CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we trained a
20-layer ResNet [64] and 121-layer DenseNet [65] respectively. For each data set, we generated 2,000 adversarial examples
from correctly classified test images by each attacking method. Among them, 1,000 adversarial images with the corresponding
1,000 natural images were used for the training process of LID, Mahalanobis and our method. Results are reported for the
other 1,000 adversarial images with the corresponding natural images. We consider the following attacking methods, grouped
by the norms they are optimized for:
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Table 1: Performance of detection methods on different data sets, models and attack methods.
Data Model Metric
Attacks
C&W L∞-PGD FGSM
KD+BU LID MAHA ML-LOO KD+BU LID MAHA ML-LOO KD+BU LID MAHA ML-LOO
MNIST CNN
AUC 0.893 1.000 0.957 1.000 0.766 0.902 0.736 1.000 0.744 0.780 0.967 1.000
TPR (FPR@0.01) 0.23 0.99 0.94 0.98 0.09 0.32 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.09 0.54 0.99
TPR (FPR@0.05) 0.46 0.99 0.94 0.98 0.28 0.58 0.12 0.99 0.15 0.23 0.92 0.99
TPR (FPR@0.10) 0.55 0.99 0.94 0.98 0.34 0.72 0.29 0.99 0.24 0.40 0.94 0.99
CIFAR10
ResNet
AUC 0.623 0.990 0.962 0.995 0.834 0.970 0.958 0.999 0.673 0.972 0.770 0.997
TPR (FPR@0.01) 0.01 0.55 0.57 0.86 0.54 0.52 0.41 0.96 0.04 0.29 0.04 0.82
TPR (FPR@0.05) 0.09 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.61 0.85 0.86 0.98 0.20 0.82 0.16 0.99
TPR (FPR@0.10) 0.22 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.62 0.91 0.91 0.98 0.29 0.93 0.38 0.99
DenseNet
AUC 0.679 0.958 0.966 0.977 0.955 0.952 0.768 0.997 0.790 0.706 0.829 1.000
TPR (FPR@0.01) 0.06 0.30 0.48 0.33 0.69 0.51 0.03 0.99 0.17 0.04 0.00 0.99
TPR (FPR@0.05) 0.13 0.79 0.91 0.84 0.74 0.84 0.23 0.99 0.28 0.12 0.29 0.99
TPR (FPR@0.10) 0.22 0.91 0.94 0.98 0.80 0.88 0.31 0.99 0.41 0.23 0.51 0.99
CIFAR100
ResNet
AUC 0.637 0.717 0.945 0.967 0.855 0.984 0.966 0.999 0.773 0.985 0.875 1.000
TPR (FPR@0.01) 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.59 0.69 0.48 0.94 0.39 0.48 0.12 0.99
TPR (FPR@0.05) 0.16 0.01 0.52 0.70 0.61 0.94 0.82 0.99 0.49 0.89 0.43 0.99
TPR (FPR@0.10) 0.29 0.01 0.80 0.92 0.64 0.96 0.92 0.99 0.56 0.99 0.57 0.99
DenseNet
AUC 0.567 0.727 0.916 0.958 0.549 0.732 0.947 0.971 0.577 0.751 0.951 0.974
TPR (FPR@0.01) 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.31
TPR (FPR@0.05) 0.17 0.15 0.61 0.66 0.14 0.01 0.70 0.75 0.17 0.06 0.77 0.81
TPR (FPR@0.10) 0.22 0.26 0.84 0.88 0.20 0.04 0.91 0.96 0.23 0.18 0.93 0.94
Data Model Metric
Attacks
JSMA DeepFool Boundary
KD+BU LID MAHA ML-LOO KD+BU LID MAHA ML-LOO KD+BU LID MAHA ML-LOO
MNIST CNN
AUC 0.886 1.000 0.976 1.000 0.901 1.000 0.869 1.000 0.905 1.000 0.991 1.000
TPR (FPR@0.01) 0.30 1.00 0.87 0.99 0.32 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.32 1.00 0.79 1.00
TPR (FPR@0.05) 0.46 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.43 1.00 0.36 1.00 0.45 1.00 0.98 1.00
TPR (FPR@0.10) 0.51 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.57 1.00 0.59 1.00 0.55 1.00 0.98 1.00
CIFAR10
ResNet
AUC 0.614 0.986 0.941 0.981 0.618 0.990 0.981 0.994 0.676 0.990 0.967 0.997
TPR (FPR@0.01) 0.01 0.49 0.45 0.46 0.01 0.57 0.60 0.89 0.03 0.64 0.60 0.92
TPR (FPR@0.05) 0.10 0.98 0.87 0.82 0.10 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.20 0.99 0.94 0.99
TPR (FPR@0.10) 0.21 0.99 0.90 0.99 0.24 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.38 0.99 0.94 0.99
DenseNet
AUC 0.645 0.937 0.947 0.964 0.646 0.976 0.977 0.976 0.700 0.983 0.981 0.980
TPR (FPR@0.01) 0.04 0.14 0.41 0.12 0.03 0.34 0.51 0.24 0.05 0.58 0.62 0.31
TPR (FPR@0.05) 0.10 0.67 0.68 0.72 0.09 0.90 0.95 0.82 0.12 0.93 0.91 0.89
TPR (FPR@0.10) 0.18 0.86 0.88 0.96 0.17 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.23 0.98 0.96 0.98
CIFAR100
ResNet
AUC 0.600 0.740 0.907 0.964 0.610 0.714 0.953 0.970 0.635 0.732 0.956 0.972
TPR (FPR@0.01) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.42 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.49
TPR (FPR@0.05) 0.12 0.14 0.49 0.70 0.14 0.01 0.56 0.74 0.16 0.07 0.61 0.78
TPR (FPR@0.10) 0.27 0.24 0.77 0.91 0.29 0.01 0.87 0.94 0.30 0.15 0.94 0.93
DenseNet
AUC 0.567 0.727 0.916 0.958 0.549 0.732 0.947 0.971 0.577 0.751 0.951 0.974
TPR (FPR@0.01) 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.31
TPR (FPR@0.05) 0.17 0.15 0.61 0.66 0.14 0.01 0.70 0.75 0.17 0.06 0.77 0.81
TPR (FPR@0.10) 0.22 0.26 0.84 0.88 0.20 0.04 0.91 0.96 0.23 0.18 0.93 0.94
• L∞: FGSM [3], L∞-PGD [4, 8].
• L2: C&W [7], DeepFool [5], Boundary Attack [15].
• L0: JSMA [6].
Let true positive rate (TPR) be the proportion of adversarial images classified as adversarial, and false positive rate (FPR) be
the proportion of natural images classified as adversarial. We report area under the curve (AUC) of the ROC curve as the
performance evaluation as well as the true positive rates by thresholding FPR at 0.01,0.05 and 0.1, as it is practical to keep
misclassified natural images at a low proportion.
The results are reported in Table 1, and the ROC curves on CIFAR-10 with ResNet are shown in Figure 3. The rest of the
plots can be found in Appendix 6.3 and Appendix 6.4. ML-LOO shows superior performance over the other three detection
methods across different data sets, models for all attacks optimized for L2 and L∞ distances. By controlling FPR at 0.1, our
method is able to find over 95% adversarial examples generated by most existing attacks.
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Table 2. Top: Performance of detection methods trained with C&W-MIX and tested on C&W-LC, C&W-HC and C&W-MIX.
Bottom: Performance of detection methods trained with L∞-PGD-MIX and tested on L∞-PGD-LC, L∞-PGD-HC and L∞-PGD-
MIX.
Data Model Metric
Attacks
C&W MIX C&W LC C&W HC
KD+BU LID MAHA ML-LOO KD+BU LID MAHA ML-LOO KD+BU LID MAHA ML-LOO
CIFAR10 ResNet
AUC 0.620 0.649 0.640 0.840 0.623 0.445 0.641 0.711 0.829 0.816 0.966 0.988
TPR (FPR@0.01) 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.25 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.52 0.23 0.51 0.87
TPR (FPR@0.05) 0.17 0.06 0.14 0.42 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.21 0.59 0.43 0.90 0.94
TPR (FPR@0.10) 0.28 0.19 0.21 0.59 0.22 0.11 0.16 0.34 0.60 0.62 0.93 0.97
Data Model Metric
Attacks
L∞-PGD-MIX L∞-PGD-LC L∞-PGD-HC
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Figure 4. The left two figures plot the histogram of confidence levels of C&W-LC, C&W-HC, and C&W-MIX, and the ROC
curves of detection methods under C&W-MIX attack. The right two figures plot the histogram of confidence levels of L∞-PGD-
LC, L∞-PGD-HC, and L∞-PGD-MIX, and the ROC curves of detection methods under L∞-PGD-MIX attack.
4.2 Attacks with varied confidence levels
Lu et al. [33] and Athalye et al. [34] observed that LID fails when the confidence level of adversarial examples generated from
C&W attack varies. We consider adversarial images with varied confidence levels for both L2 and L∞ attacks. We use C&W
attack for optimizing L2 distance, and adjust the confidence hyperparameter c in Equation (3) to achieve mixed confidence
levels. To achieve adversarial examples optimized for L∞ distance, we use L∞-PGD for optimizing L∞ distance, and vary
the constraint ε for different confidence levels.
C&W Attack for optimizing L2 distance We consider three settings for C&W attack, low-confidence (C&W-LC), mixed-
confidence (C&W-MIX) and high-confidence (C&W-HC). We set the confidence parameter c = 0 for C&W-LC and c = 50
for C&W-HC. For mixed-confidence C&W attack, we generate adversarial images from C&W attack with the confidence
parameter in Equation (3) randomly selected from {1, 3, 5, · · · , 29} when generating an adversarial image, so that the dis-
tribution of confidence levels for adversarial images is comparable with that of original images. The confidence levels of
images under the three settings, along with confidence levels of original images are shown in Figure 4. The confidence level
in Figure 4 is defined as − log(1− p), where p is the probability score of the predicted class.
We carried out the experiments on ResNet trained on CIFAR-10 using 1, 000 adversarial images generated from the mixed-
confidence C&W attack, together with the corresponding original images, as the training data for LID, Mahalanobis, KD+BU,
and our method. We test the detection methods on a different set of original and adversarial images generated from three
versions: low-confidence C&W attack (c = 0), high-confidence C&W attack (c = 50), and the mixed-confidence C&W
attack. Table 2 (Top) and Figure 4 (Left) show TPRs at different FPR thresholds, AUC, and the ROC curve. Mahalanobis,
LID and KD+BU fail to detect adversarial examples of mixed-confidence effectively, while our method performs consistently
better for adversarial images across the three settings.
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Table 3. Performance of detection methods trained with C&W and transferred to L∞-PGD, FGSM, JSMA, Boundary and Deep-
Fool.
Data Model Metric
Attacks
L∞-PGD DeepFool FGSM JSAM Boundary
KD+BU LID MAHA ML-LOO KD+BU LID MAHA ML-LOO KD+BU LID MAHA ML-LOO KD+BU LID MAHA ML-LOO KD+BU LID MAHA ML-LOO
CIFAR10 ResNet
AUC 0.753 0.763 0.818 0.879 0.618 0.990 0.962 0.992 0.673 0.610 0.730 0.796 0.614 0.984 0.957 0.984 0.676 0.991 0.964 0.994
TPR (FPR@0.01) 0.20 0.08 0.14 0.21 0.01 0.56 0.61 0.72 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.03 0.56 0.60 0.82
TPR (FPR@0.05) 0.37 0.35 0.45 0.48 0.10 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.20 0.17 0.22 0.14 0.10 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.20 0.99 0.95 0.97
TPR (FPR@0.10) 0.46 0.45 0.60 0.65 0.24 0.98 0.94 0.99 0.29 0.23 0.34 0.37 0.21 0.98 0.94 0.99 0.38 0.99 0.95 0.99
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Figure 5. Transferability of detection methods trained with C&W attack and tested on L∞-PGD, FGSM, JSMA, Boundary and
DeepFool.
L∞-PGD for optimizing L∞ distance L∞-PGD [8], also named as BIM [4], searches for adversarial examples by itera-
tively updating the original image with the following:
xN+1 = Clipx,ε{xN + αsign(∇XJ(xN , ytrue))}, (4)
where ytrue is the original class, J is the cross-entropy loss, and Clip operator clips an image elementwise to an ε-neighborhood.
For mixed-confidence L∞-PGD attack, we generated adversarial images from L∞-PGD with different confidence levels by
randomly selecting the constraint ε in Equation (4) from {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}/255. The confidence levels of images from
mixed-confidence L∞-PGD attack are shown in Figure 4.
We used 1, 000 adversarial images generated from the mixed-confidence L∞-PGD, together with their corresponding original
images, as the training data for all detection methods. We report the results on adversarial images generated from three
versions: high-confidence L∞-PGD (ε = 0.03), low-confidence L∞-PGD (ε = 0.005), and the mixed-confidence L∞-PGD
that is used to generate the training data. The corresponding original images are different from the training images. Table 2
(Bottom) and Figure 4 (Right) show TPRs at different FPR thresholds, AUC, and the ROC curve. Mahalanobis, LID and
KD+BU fail to detect adversarial examples of mixed-confidence effectively, while our method performs significantly better
across the three settings.
4.3 Transferability
In this experiment, we evaluate the transferability of different methods by training detection methods on adversarial examples
generated from one attacking method and carry out the evaluation on adversarial examples generated from different attacking
methods. We trained all methods on adversarial examples generated by C&W attack and carried out the evaluation on
adversarial examples generated by the rest of the attacking methods.
Experiments are carried out on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100 datasets. AUC and TPRs at different FPR thresholds are
reported in Table 3. All methods trained on C&W attack are capable of detecting adversarial examples generated from an
unknown attack, even when the optimized distance is L∞, or the attack is not gradient-based. The same phenomenon has
been observed in Lee et al. [60] as well. This indicates attacks might share some common features. Our method yields a
slightly higher AUC consistently, and has a significantly higher TPR when FPRs are controlled to be small.
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5 Discussion
In this paper, we have introduced a new framework to detect adversarial examples with multi-layer feature attribution, by
capturing the scaling difference of feature attribution scores between original and adversarial examples. We show that our
detection method outperforms other state-of-the-art detection methods in detecting various kinds of attacks. In particular, we
show our method is able to detect adversarial examples of various confidence levels, and transfers between different attacks.
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6 appendix
6.1 Performance of Integrated Gradients
In this section, we evaluate the detection of adversarial examples by thresholding the IQR of another popular feature attribution
method Integrated Gradients (IG), and compare it with KD+BU, LID, MAHA, and ML-LOO. We consider three attacks
FGSM, C&W and JSMA, which are optimized for L∞, L2 and L0 distances respectively, on CIFAR-10 dataset with ResNet.
We can see that IQR of IG achieves competitive performance in detecting adversarial examples, but not as powerful as the
detection methods which incorporated multi-layer information like LID, MAHA and our proposed method ML-LOO. The IG
feature is also not as effective as the LOO feature (whose performance is shown in Figure 8).
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
FGSM (CIFAR-10, ResNet)
LID (AUC: 0.972)
MAHA (AUC: 0.764)
KD+BU (AUC: 0.673)
ML-LOO (AUC: 0.997)
IG (AUC: 0.667)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
JSMA (CIFAR-10, ResNet)
LID (AUC: 0.985)
MAHA (AUC: 0.942)
KD+BU (AUC: 0.614)
ML-LOO (AUC: 0.985)
IG (AUC: 0.880)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
C&W (CIFAR-10, ResNet)
LID (AUC: 0.990)
MAHA (AUC: 0.962)
KD+BU (AUC: 0.623)
ML-LOO (AUC: 0.995)
IG (AUC: 0.802)
Figure 6. ROC curves of detection methods on CIFAR-10 dataset with ResNet. We restrict FPR between 0 and 0.2, which is
meaningful in practice. See Appendix 6.4 for full plots.
15 ML-LOO: Detecting Adversarial Examples with Feature Attribution
6.2 Comparison Based on Dispersion Measures
In this section, we compare performance of detection using three different dispersion measures of feature attributions: IQR,
STD and MAD.
Figure 7 shows the histograms of these three dispersion measures of feature attributions for ResNet on natural test images from
CIFAR-10 with those on adversarially perturbed images, where the adversarial perturbation is carried out by C&W Attack.
We can see there is a significant difference in the distributions of the dispersion measures between natural and adversarial
images.
Figure 8 shows the ROC curves of the three dispersion statistics on CIFAR-10 with ResNet. We can see that all three
dispersion measures achieve competitive performance in detecting adversarial examples generated by three attacks C&W,
JSMA and L∞-PGD, but IQR achieves the largest AUC values across all attacking methods.
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Figure 7: Histogram of Statistics
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Figure 8: ROC curves of different statistics on CIFAR-10 dataset with ResNet
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6.3 ROC curves of detection methods on CIFAR-10, MNIST and CIFAR-100 data sets with FPR
from 0.0 to 0.2
Figure 9, Figure 10, Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13 show the ROC curves of four detection method (LID, MAHA,
KD+BU, ML-LOO) on three data sets (CIFAR-10, MNIST, CIFAR-100) with three models (CNN, ResNet, DenseNet) under
six attacks (FGSM, JSMA, C&W, DeepFool, Boundary, L∞-PGD) where FPR is from 0.0 to 0.2, which is the setting of
practical interest. The ROC curves where FPR is from 0.0 to 1.0 are shown in Appendix 6.4.
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Figure 9: ROC curves of detection methods on MNIST dataset with CNN
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Figure 10: ROC curves of detection methods on CIFAR-10 dataset with ResNet
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Figure 11: ROC curves of detection methods on CIFAR-10 dataset with DenseNet
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Figure 12: ROC curves of detection methods on CIFAR-100 dataset with ResNet
0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.100 0.125 0.150 0.175 0.200
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
FGSM (CIFAR-100, DenseNet)
LID (AUC: 0.979)
MAHA (AUC: 0.808)
KD+BU (AUC: 0.764)
ML-LOO (AUC: 1.000)
0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.100 0.125 0.150 0.175 0.200
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
JSMA (CIFAR-100, DenseNet)
LID (AUC: 0.727)
MAHA (AUC: 0.916)
KD+BU (AUC: 0.567)
ML-LOO (AUC: 0.958)
0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.100 0.125 0.150 0.175 0.200
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
C&W (CIFAR-100, DenseNet)
LID (AUC: 0.719)
MAHA (AUC: 0.930)
KD+BU (AUC: 0.575)
ML-LOO (AUC: 0.968)
0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.100 0.125 0.150 0.175 0.200
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
DeepFool (CIFAR-100, DenseNet)
LID (AUC: 0.732)
MAHA (AUC: 0.947)
KD+BU (AUC: 0.549)
ML-LOO (AUC: 0.971)
0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.100 0.125 0.150 0.175 0.200
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
BOUNDARY (CIFAR-100, DenseNet)
LID (AUC: 0.751)
MAHA (AUC: 0.951)
KD+BU (AUC: 0.577)
ML-LOO (AUC: 0.974)
0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.100 0.125 0.150 0.175 0.200
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
L -PGD (CIFAR-100, DenseNet)
LID (AUC: 0.965)
MAHA (AUC: 0.719)
KD+BU (AUC: 0.882)
ML-LOO (AUC: 1.000)
Figure 13: ROC curves of detection methods on CIFAR-100 dataset with DenseNet
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6.4 ROC curves of detection methods on CIFAR-10, MNIST and CIFAR-100 data sets with FPR
from 0.0 to 1.0
In this section, we show the ROC curves of four detection method (LID, MAHA, KD+BU, ML-LOO) on three data sets
(CIFAR-10, MNIST, CIFAR-100) with three models (CNN, ResNet, DenseNet) under six attacks (FGSM, JSMA, C&W,
DeepFool, Boundary, L∞-PGD) where FPR is from 0.0 to 1.0.
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Figure 14: ROC curves of detection methods on CIFAR-10 dataset with ResNet
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Figure 15: ROC curves of detection methods on CIFAR-10 dataset with DenseNet
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Figure 16: ROC curves of detection methods on MNIST dataset with CNN
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Figure 17: ROC curves of detection methods on CIFAR-100 dataset with ResNet
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
FGSM (CIFAR-100, DenseNet)
LID (AUC: 0.979)
MAHA (AUC: 0.808)
KD+BU (AUC: 0.764)
ML-LOO (AUC: 1.000)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
JSMA (CIFAR-100, DenseNet)
LID (AUC: 0.727)
MAHA (AUC: 0.916)
KD+BU (AUC: 0.567)
ML-LOO (AUC: 0.958)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
C&W (CIFAR-100, DenseNet)
LID (AUC: 0.719)
MAHA (AUC: 0.930)
KD+BU (AUC: 0.575)
ML-LOO (AUC: 0.968)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
DeepFool (CIFAR-100, DenseNet)
LID (AUC: 0.732)
MAHA (AUC: 0.947)
KD+BU (AUC: 0.549)
ML-LOO (AUC: 0.971)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
BOUNDARY (CIFAR-100, DenseNet)
LID (AUC: 0.751)
MAHA (AUC: 0.951)
KD+BU (AUC: 0.577)
ML-LOO (AUC: 0.974)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
L -PGD (CIFAR-100, DenseNet)
LID (AUC: 0.965)
MAHA (AUC: 0.719)
KD+BU (AUC: 0.882)
ML-LOO (AUC: 1.000)
Figure 18: ROC curves of detection methods on CIFAR-100 dataset with DenseNet
